THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING WRIT, PART II: HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 by EADE, MARY E.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 16
Spring 3-1-1997
THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING WRIT, PART
II: HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE ANTI-
TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1996
MARY E. EADE
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
MARY E. EADE, THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING WRIT, PART II: HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, 9 Cap. DEF J. 55 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol9/iss2/16
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 - Page 55
THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING WRIT, PART II: HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
BY: MARY E. EADE
I. Introduction
This article updates "The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Cor-
pus Under the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"
published last term in the Capital Defense Journal.1 It addresses early
judicial interpretations of four provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: (1) what it takes to qualify as an
"opt-in" state; (2) when a conviction becomes final in non opt-in states,
triggering filing deadlines in federal court; (3) what degree of deference
is owed to state conclusions of law; and (4) what showing is required
before a federal court can grant an evidentiary hearing.
2
H. Judicial Interpretations of ATEDA's Habeas Corpus
Provisions
The plain language of ATEDA shrinks the writ of habeas corpus in
two ways. First, it creates a new chapter, Chapter 154, applicable only in
capital cases. For states meeting the chapter's requirements in their
collateral proceedings, the chapter establishes a mechanism that con-
stricts the time in which apetitioner may file a federal habeas petition and
the types of claims that may be filed. For example, a petitioner in a
qualifying state can be required to file in half the time of a petitioner in
a non-qualifying state. Additionally, while ATEDA allows prisoners to
I Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9., No. I, p. 52 (1996). Part I
summarizes habeas corpus before ATEDA and explains ATEDA's
major provisions.
2 Also significant is ATEDA's apparent limitation on what types of
claims a federal habeas court can hear. That question is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 2264(a) which prohibits hearing any claim that was not raised
and decided on the merits in state court unless the petitioner meets one
of three exceptions: (1) the failure to raise the claim was caused by "State
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States"; (2)
was caused by the Supreme Court's recognition of a new federal right
made retroactive; or (3) was based on a factual predicate that could not
be discovered with due diligence. Only one case has addressed this
provision, Lindh v. Murray, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh
Circuit explained that this provision replaced the exhaustion require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). Id. at 862.
3 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) states that otherwise defaulted claims will be
decided on the merits only if the petitioner's failure to raise them on the
merits was
(2) the result of the Supreme Court's recognition of a
new Federal right that is made retroactively appli-
cable; or
(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence
in time to present the claim for State or Federal post-
conviction review.
One commentator has argued that this standard apparently omits
claims of actual innocence, which, prior to ATEDA, were a substitute for
a petitioner's inability to show cause for default. Larry W. Yackle, A
raise claims that were properly raised in state court and decided on the
merits, defaulted claims are subject to what may be a new standard.
3
Those mechanisms are codified at 28 U.S.C § 2261, et seq. Meeting the
standards is called "opting in," so any state that qualifies is known as an
"opt-in" state. Thus far, courts have held that § 2261 establishes a quid
pro quo arrangement and have required strict compliance with its
language. No state that has come up for review has satisfied the statute's
mandates.
Second, ATEDA appears to constrict the availability of habeas
relief generally by amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,2253, and 2254. Those
amendments mandate greater deference to state conclusions of law and
findings of fact, limit successive petitions, and impose restrictive
standards for granting evidentiary hearings and appeals from district
court denials of relief. This article addresses judicial interpretations of
two of these restrictions-the deference owed to state court conclusions
of law and the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 22614: Opt-in Requirements
To date, California, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia have
failed the test for opting-in to ATEDA's benefits of shorter filing
deadlines and limits on the kinds of claims that may be raised. In Hamblin
Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 397
(1996) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)).
4 Section 2261 reads in relevant part:
(a) This chapter shall apply to cases arising under section
2254 brought by prisoners in State custody who are
subject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only if the
provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied.
(b) This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by
statute, rule of its court of last resort, orby another agency
authorized by State law, a mechanism for the appoint-
ment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litiga-
tion expenses of competent counsel in State post-convic-
tion proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose
capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on
direct appeal to the court of last resort in the State or have
otherwise become final for State law purposes. The rule
of court or statute must provide standards of competency
for the appointment of such counsel.
(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation,
and reimbursement of counsel as provided in subsection
(b) must offer counsel to all State prisoners under capital
sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a
court of record-
(1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the
prisoner upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent
and accepted the offer or is unable competently to
decide whether to accept or reject the offer,
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v. Anderson,5 the district court denied Ohio opt-in status because, while
state habeas petitioners have the right to counsel, that right is not
absolute. 6 Instead, Ohio public defenders retain authority to deny indi-
gent petitioners counsel if they conclude that the issues raised do not have
merit.7 That retained discretion directly violated § 2261(c) which man-
dates that all indigent state habeas petitioners be afforded counsel. Ohio
failed for a second reason. Its law provides that when public defenders
represent indigent habeas petitioners, they do not do so through "an order
by a court of record." 8 The court explained that its "decision [was]
governed by the principle that Congress did not write Chapter 154 in
terms of substantial compliance." 9 Other courts are of the same opinion;
they have ruled that § 2261 sets up a quid pro quo arrangement and that
to "opt-in" states must strictly comply with the statute's language.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mata v.
Johnson10 ruled that Texas was not an opt-in state because it failed to
provide explicit standards for competency of counsel and it failed to
appoint counsel by virtue of a court order. 11 The Texas Court of Appeals,
which had been delegated the rule-making authority, established a rule
that all appointed capital counsel must answer a questionnaire and submit
it for approval to the Court of Criminal Appeals which would review it
for competency on a case-by-case basis. The Fifth Circuit held that this
mechanism failed §2261(b) because it did not establish "explicit stan-
dards."
12
Similarly, Florida failed the test set forth in § 2261(b). Only two
Florida provisions addressed competency of capital habeas counsel
(known as Capital Collateral Representatives (CCR)). One must have
been a member of the Florida bar for at least five years, and a full-time
assistant CCR must have been a member in good standing with not less
than two years experience in the practice of criminal law. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida concluded that
those provisions were simply inadequate. 13 The court noted that there
was no requirement that counsel have any degree of specialization in
habeas proceedings, and there was no provision for standards governing
substitute counsel should the CCR office be conflicted out. 14 The court
ruled that the plain language of § 2261 "contemplate[d] counsel who are
competent through capital, post-conviction experience." 15 The court
found that general supervision by the Supreme Court of Florida was not
sufficient. Noting that capital habeas proceedings often present complex,
and sometimes novel, issues and that their success depends on experi-
enced counsel, the court refused to accept the standards as adequate.
(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the
prisoner rejected the offer of counsel and made the
decision with an understanding of its legal conse-
quences; or
(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a find-
ing that the prisoner is not indigent.
5 947 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Oh. 1996).
6 1d. at 1181-82.
7 Id. at 1182.
81d.
91d.
10 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir. 1996).
11 Id. at 1267.
12 Id. Interestingly, Texas satisfied the mandate that it provide
adequate compensation and reasonable litigation expenses by establish-
ing a fee of $7,500 plus $2,500 in reimbursement expenses. Id. at 1266.
13 Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 1996).
14 Id.
151Id.
Instead, § 2261 called for a specific mechanism that ensured competent,
experienced habeas counsel would be appointed.
16
This holding is significant in that it reaches beyond the plain
language of § 2261 and requires that the competency standards set by a
state must provide that appointed counsel be experienced habeas
counsel. The decision is good law and gives hope that the courts will
continue to be unwilling to gut habeas to the degree that the language of
ATEDA suggests it may be eviscerated. Also, it represents a check
against § 2261(e) of ATEDA which prohibits petitioners from raising
ineffective assistance of counsel claims during state or federal collateral
proceedings; instead, attorney incompetence may result only in appoint-
ment of different counsel. 
17
Under the same rationale, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee found that Tennessee's competency stan-
dards did not satisfy § 2261 because they did not ensure "that only
qualified, competent counsel [would] be appointed to represent habeas
petitioners in capital cases." 18 The current standard required only that
counsel be "a competent attorney licensed in th[e] state." 19 The court
found that merely passing the state bar exam did not mean that counsel
was competent to handle capital habeas proceedings. Moreover, stated
the court, because § 2261(e) precludes ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in state and federal collateral proceedings, it has become crucial
that only qualified attorneys be appointed to represent indigent capital
habeas petitioners. 20 Thus, both Florida and Tennessee petitioners have
been given a stronger guarantee of competent, experienced counsel than
the language of ATEDA itself appears to afford.
Florida failed to meet § 2261 for a second reason. According to the
court, "any offer of counsel pursuant to Section 2261 must be a meaning-
ful offer.' '21 A meaningful offer meant immediate appointment upon
request. At the time the court heard Hill's petition, there were a large
number of capital prisoners who had accepted Florida's offer of counsel
but who had not yet been appointed counsel. 22 The backlog showed that
Florida had not "opted-in." It could not reap the benefits of shorter filing
deadlines and limited claims. 23 Finally, the court noted that to hold
otherwise could have the "effect of shrinking the six-month statute of
limitations under Chapter 154 to such a short amount of time that it would
deprive capital defendants of procedural due process."
'24
This conclusion affords an argument for counsel who must avert the
application of shorter deadlines to capital habeas petitioners who are
subject to ATEDA. Such petitioners include all those whose petitions
16 1d. at 1143-44.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2261(e) reads:
The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital
case shall not be a ground forreliefin a proceeding arising
under section 2254. This limitation shall not preclude the
appointment of different counsel, on the court's own
motion or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of
State orFederal post-conviction proceedings on the basis
of the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such
proceedings.
18Austin v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-62 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
19Id. at 1162.
20 Id.
21 Hill, 941 F. Supp. at 1147 (emphasis in original).
22 Id. at 1144.
23 Id. at 1146-47.
24 d. at 1147, n.35.
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were pending on the date of enactment, April 24, 1996, since the Act
expressly provides that it applies in such a situation.25 Even if a state has
not opted-in, ATEDA has imposed a filing deadline; it is one year from
"the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."'26 For
counsel who can show that the State delayed appointment or failed to
timely provide any resource to which a habeas petitioner has a right, such
as a psychological expert, there may be an argument that if applied, the
filing deadline imposed by ATEDA would violate petitioner's due
process rights.
California attempted to opt-in under the provisions of § 2265 which
provides the steps that states who have a unitary review system must take
to qualify.27 In Ashmus v. Calderon,28 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California held that California was not an opt-
in state.29 The state failed for three reasons: (1) its mechanism for the
appointment and compensation of counsel precluded use of public funds
to conduct a generalized investigation; counsel could only investigate
claims "knowable by reference to the four comers of the appellate
record"; 30 (2) the state's competency guidelines were inadequate; and
(3) California had failed to make a "bona fide" offer of counsel.
3 1
California's scheme for the appointment of counsel for capital
habeas petitioners expressly barred spending public funds to conduct a
generalized investigation geared to uncover facts that supported new
meritorious claims. Counsel was authorized to spend only for claims that
had come to counsel's attention during the course of preparation for the
pending appeal, i.e. only those discoverable from the record as it was
developed. The court held that this limitation ran directly afoul of §
2265(a) which mandated that there be compensation for "such claims as
could be raised on collateral attack."'32 This language encompassed all
possible claims, not just those that were discernable from the record.
Additionally, the limitations "create[d] an objectively deficient
standard for the performance of counsel appointed to seek collateral
relief in satisfaction of" the quid pro quo arrangement set out in the new
provisions of ATEDA. 33 Like the Florida court and the Tennessee court,
the California court refused to condone a mechanism that facilitated,
even required, sub-par representation. Accordingly, the court ruled that
California's competency standards were insufficient. 34 California had
guidelines, but they were not a rule of court or statute, did not impose any
mandatory standards, and did not require that counsel have any experi-
ence or competence in bringing habeas petitions. The court rejected the
argument that competence in criminal appeals was the equivalent to
competence in habeas proceedings, expressly noting the unique com-
plexity of habeas.35 Finally, California, too, was backlogged by would-
be habeas petitioners whose appointments of counsel were still pending.
25 Section 107(c) of Pub. L. 104-132 reads: "Chapter 154 of title 28,
United States Code... shall apply to cases pending on or after the date
of enactment of this Act [April 24, 1996]."
26 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2265 reads in relevant part:
(a) For purposes of this section, a "unitary review"
procedure means a State procedure that authorizes a
person under sentence of death to raise, in the course
of direct review of thejudgment, such claims as could
be raised on collateral attack. This chapter shall
apply, as provided in this section, in relation to a State
unitary review procedure if the State established by
rule of its court of last resort orby statute a mechanism
for the appointment, compensation, and payment of
reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel
in the unitary review proceedings, including expenses
relating to the litigation of collateral claims in the
The court ruled that the failure to make appointments contravened the
express requirement of § 2265(b), which by incorporating § 2261(c),
mandates immediate appointment of counsel. California had not opted-
in.
These opinions are significant in three respects. First, they establish
a standard of strict compliance for opting-in. Second, they formally
recognize the unique complexity of habeas corpus proceedings and
require the states to embody this recognition in their standards of
competency for appointed counsel. This mandate constitutes an infusion
of fairness into the process that has not necessarily existed, particularly
in Virginia (although, of course, these decisions do not govern Virginia).
Third, they buttress the apparent congressional understanding that the
limitations imposed by the opt-in provisions are fundamentally unfair
absent some guarantees on the part of the states.
The Fourth Circuit also has found that Chapter 154 established a
quid pro quo arrangement. In Bennett v. Angelone,36 the court specifi-
cally noted that Congress contemplated that states would only receive the
benefits of ATEDA if they offered the guarantees demanded by Chapter
154.37 In apparent contradiction of this finding, the Fourth Circuit has,
by order, given fourth circuit states some of the benefits of Chapter 154,
even though they have not opted-in. Specifically, the court has exercised
its authority to set its own time table and directed the district and circuit
courts to follow the time limitations for rendering decisions that are given
to opt-in states.38 Consequently, Virginia has been given an ATEDA
benefit without having to pay for it with the guarantees that Congress
contemplated.
Although it only shortens the time that capital habeas petitions are
under consideration, the Fourth Circuit order is curious in light of the
holding of a Virginia federal district court. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has held that Virginia is not an
opt-in state. The decisions of this court warrant review because they
illuminate the guarantees that Congress wanted and that the Fourth
Circuit deemed unnecessary by virtue of its order. These cases are
Satcher v. Netherland39 and Wright v. Angelone.
40
In Satcher, the court held that ATEDA required "a formal, institu-
tionalized commitment to the payment of counsel and litigation ex-
penses." 41 Virginia had no express provision for compensation or
payment of litigation expenses for appointed capital habeas counsel.
Budget legislation that set aside funds for payment of appointed counsel
did not constitute the "mechanism" for payment that ATEDA contem-
plated. 42 At best, this reservation, in addition to statutory provision of
counsel and evidence of past payment, amounted only to substantial
compliance with ATEDA. The court ruled that § 2261 required absolute
proceedings. The rule of court or statute must provide
standards of competency for the appointment of such
counsel.
28 935 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
29 Id. at 1075.
30 1d. at 1071.
31 Id. at 1071-75.
32 Id. at 1071 (emphasis in original).
33 1d.
34 1d. at 1074.
35 Id.
36 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996).
3 7 Id. at 1342.
38 See Section B, infra.
39 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1996).
40 944 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1996).
41 944 F. Supp. at 1242.
42 1d. at 1241.
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compliance:
[Sitrict interpretation is necessary to meaningfully effectuate
the quid pro quo arrangement which lies at the core of Chapter
154. This is critically important because, if a state provides full
and fair state habeas proceedings, the federal courts will be
able to review cases more quickly and efficiently because they
will have the benefit of a fully developed record of facts and
constitutional rulings to review.
43
Congress thought that the strict requirements were necessary to full
and fair habeas review, according to the court. Thus, the state cannot be
given the benefits without its having met the requirements because to do
so would be to subject prisoners to less than full and fair habeas review.
44
Virginia was not an opt-in state.
Another opinion of the district court re-affirmed this holding in
Wright v. Angelone.45 At the same time, this panel disagreed with the
Satcher court, finding that Virginia had not satisfied section 2261's
requirement that competency standards be established. While Va. Code
§ 19.2-63.8(B) gave the Public Defender Commission the authority to
promulgate standards, the standards themselves were not in place. 46 All
that existed were guidelines containing criteria that the Commission
could consider, but that consideration must have been undertaken "only
to the extent practicable." 47 There was no requirement that court-
appointed counsel have any habeas experience; instead counsel needed
only to be "familiar" with habeas practice. The degree of "familiarity"
was not defined. Also, there was no mechanism that ensured appointed
counsel in fact met the criteria that was in place. Those provisions were
"grossly inadequate," according to the court. 48 Like the other courts, the
district court explained that standards of competency were "crucial" to
ensure that state habeas petitioners had qualified, competent counsel,
particularly because § 2261(e) barred ineffective assistance claims. 49
The court concluded, "Until Virginia establishes a mechanism which
clearly and succinctly defines how counsel are to be appointed and the
method by which they are to be compensated, as well as imposes
mandatory standards of competency, it will not enjoy the habeas benefits
of Section 107 of the AEDPA."
50
Taken together, all of the above holdings reflect a common point
of view. Each court has ruled that § 2261 is an "insurance policy" of sorts,
interpreting it as an expression of a serious congressional concern over
the quality of state habeas proceedings. Congress was unwilling to
shorten the time in which prisoners could file their claims or limit the
types of claims they may file unless a state ensured by law and rule of
court that those prisoners would be adequately and competently repre-
sented. While one may argue that ATEDA codifies the current congres-
sional sentiment that calls for less intrusion into the states' affairs by the
federal system, these courts found that this ideal was shadowed by a
43 Id. at 1245.
44 1d. Virginia did provide adequate standards of competency which
were established on July 1992 by the Public Defender Commission
pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-163.8(B).
45 944 F. Supp. at 464.
46 Pursuant to this statute, Virginia now has standards in place.
Their adequacy, however, remains questionable. They are generalized
and waivable. They do not require appointment of two attorneys, and
they do not address qualifications. Consequently, they retain many of the
deficiencies identified by the court in Wright.
47 Wright, 944 F. Supp. at 466.
48 Id. at 467.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 468.
51 This decision can be important to defense counsel. The acceler-
contemporaneous reluctance to vest complete trust in the states. Con-
gress has provided some federal control over what process is due,
according to these courts. In order to reap the benefits ATEDA offers, the
legislatures of California, Ohio, Tennessee and Texas will have to act.
Habeas counsel in those states have been afforded some relief from the
retroactive application of § 2261. Habeas counsel in Virginia, on the
other hand, face part of the time constraints that Chapter 154 imposes
because the Fourth Circuit has ordered the district and circuit courts to
follow the time constraints for court decisions that are codified in §
2266.51
B. 28 U.S.C. § 2266: Limitations on Time for Decision
By order, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
The limitations on time for decision set for in 28 U.S.C.A.
Section 2266 shall apply at the district and circuit court levels
and the Circuit Executive is authorized to inquire into the
reasons for any noncompliance with the limitations.
52
Consequently, Virginia capital habeas counsel are now burdened
by the accelerated schedule contemplated by ATEDA. Under § 2266, the
district court is required to render a final judgment within 180 days of the
date on which the petition is filed. This time period may be extended by
30 days if the district court determines that the ends of justice would be
best served by such a delay.53 The court of appeals must render its final
decision within 120 days of the date on which the reply brief is filed and
must rule on any petition for rehearing or suggestion for rehearing en
banc within 30 days of the date the petition/suggestion is filed or the date
a response is filed, whichever is later.54 Counsel should note that the
Fourth Circuit, like all such courts, possesses the authority to set a time
table for decision-making with which it and the courts under its admin-
istration must comply. More important is the recognition that the court
has not ruled that Virginia is an opt-in state. Thus, ATEDA's provisions
for shorter filing deadlines and limited types of claims have not been
imposed upon Virginia.
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A): Filing deadlines
For non opt-in states, the filing deadline for a federal habeas petition
is one year from "the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
review."'55 This language was ambiguous as to whether a judgment
became final upon decision by a state court on direct review or upon the
conclusion of certiorari proceedings. The Second Circuit is the only
court that has indicated which date is controlling. In Peterson v. Demskie56
ated time schedule can prevent counsel from conducting a fruitful
investigation after filing. Often counsel find new evidence mitigating
guilt after filing a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., case summary of
Schulp v. Delo, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 4 (1995).
52 Order, In the Matter of Death Penalty Representation, (4th Cir.
1996) (No. 113). This order resulted from a recommendation made by the
Death Penalty Committee. The Committee merely stated that "[t]ime
constraints are sorely needed at present" and cited to Correll v. Thomp-
son to exemplify. In Correll, the petition for habeas was pending in the
district court in excess of threeyears before a final decision was rendered.
53 28 U.S.C. § 2266 (a)-(b).
54 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c).
55 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).
56 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1997).
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and in Reyes v. Keane,5 7 the court applied § 2244(d)(1)(A) by looking to
the date on which the state court of last resort denied relief on direct
review. Absent some indication from other courts, it remains uncertain
whether the last state court denial on direct review will be the relevant
date or whether the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court will be adopted as the trigger.
Virginia counsel should note how ATEDA's filing deadlines would
work in combination with Virginia law. Currently Virginia is not an opt-
in state. Therefore, § 2254(d)(1)(A) requires filing a federal petition
within a year of either the denial on direct review by the Supreme Court
of Virginia or the denial of certiorari. Two other rules affect the burden
that counsel will bear. First, a prisoner has 90 days to petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.5 8 Second, under Virginia law, the state
must appoint state habeas counsel within 30 days after the state court
affirms a prisoner's conviction. 59 That deadline has not always been met
by Virginia courts. Even if it is met, thirty days of valuable time to
investigate and develop facts, so crucial under ATEDA, 60 can be lost.
If Virginia becomes an opt-in state, the time for filing a federal
petition for habeas corpus will be cut in half, extended by the time
required to seek certiorari and relief in state habeas.
D. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 61: Deference to State Court Conclusions
of Law
Depending upon how it is interpreted, the new language of this
statute could operate to seriously curtail the substantive scope of federal
habeas review. New section 2254(d) mandates a degree of deference to
state court conclusions of law, not just factual determinations. If it is
interpreted as requiring virtually complete capitulation to state interpre-
tation of federal law, constitutional issues, including suspension of the
writ, are raised. This provision has been directly interpreted by two
circuit courts of appeals and one district court, and applied, without
express interpretation, by another federal circuit court.
In Lindh v. Murray,62 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded that section 2254(d)(1) extended the Teague v. Lane63 doc-
trine in two ways. First, the court addressed the section's limitation of
federal review to claims adjudicated on the merits but decided "contrary
to clearly established law, as determined by the United States Supreme
Court." This language expanded Teague's limitation on the universe of
doctrine available to a petitioner to decisions rendered by the United
States Supreme Court.64 Teague held that new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases in which
a final judgment had been rendered. Thus, if a decision by the United
States Supreme Court beneficial to a death-sentenced prisoner is decided
when the prisoner's case is at habeas, the decision generally cannot be the
basis for relief. Habeas petitioners were entitled only to the law that was
in place prior to instatement of a final judgment in their case.65 Accord-
ing to the Lindh court, after ATEDA, habeas petitioners are limited not
57 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1996).
58 Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).
59 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.7.
60 See Section F, infra.
61 § 2254(d)(1) reads:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es-
only to "old rules" of constitutional criminal procedure but also to only
those decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. Favorable federal circuit
court jurisprudence is off limits. 66 Thus, ATEDA did not remove the
power of the federal judiciary to render an independent decision on all
questions of law in a habeas petition; it only imposed a limit upon the
source of law from which a petitioner can draw to argue that the state
court violated his or her constitutional rights.
The court also found that the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), which
limits federal review to those cases where the state court made an
"unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as deter-
mined by the United States Supreme Court," was an extension of
Teague.67 Teague precludes relief in cases where the state court ruled
and subsequently the Supreme Court announced a new rule of constitu-
tional law that made the state decision incorrect. As a result, Teague
functions in a manner that "validate[s] reasonable, good-faith interpre-
tations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are
shown to be contrary to later decisions. ' 68 The Lindh court found that
the second clause of § 2254(d)(1) generalized this principle by removing
the "later decisions" proviso. 69 This language tells the federal courts:
"Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an error grave
enough to be called 'unreasonable.'
70
This rationale reflects a long-held principle of comity: the assump-
tion that state courts are just as capable as the federal courts of making
sound decisions that abide by the federal constitution. According to the
Seventh Circuit, ATEDA codified this principle and gave the states the
degree of deference that the federal courts had always claimed to have
given but perhaps a degree that was not actually conferred:
The Supreme Court of the United States sets the bounds of
what is "reasonable"; a state decision within those bounds
must be respected- not because it is right, or because federal
courts must abandon their independent decision making, but
because the grave remedy of upsetting a judgment entered by
anotherjudicial system after full litigation is reserved for grave
occasions. That is the principal change effected by §
2254(d)(1). 7 1
The court's application of this new limitation shows that absent an
egregious, apparent transgression by a state court, habeas relief will not
be available from a federal court.
In Lindh, at the time of trial, an expert psychological witness for the
prosecution was under investigation for alleged sexual misconduct. The
state court refused to allow Lindh to cross examine the expert with regard
to this conduct. On appeal, Lindh argued that this refusal violated the
Confrontation Clause. He asserted that the questioning should have been
allowed to establish bias, i.e. the expert would say what the State wanted
to gain leniency in his own predicament.72 The Seventh Circuit held that
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Confrontation Clause entitled
tablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States...
62 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996).
63 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
64 Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868, 869.
65 489 U.S. at 316.
66 96 F.3d at 869.
67Id.




72 Id. at 874.
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defendants to cross-examine witnesses to expose bias, but that the proper
scope of that cross-examination was left to the discretion of the state
courts. Thus, a state habeas court was obligated to conduct review of a
trial court's decision to limit that scope under an abuse of discretion
standard. 73 For Lindh, this conclusion meant denial of relief.
The state habeas court did exactly what Supreme Court precedent
required; it conducted an abuse of discretion analysis, finding no abuse.
Even if its finding were incorrect, it had not unreasonably applied
"clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States."74 The key distinction to recognize, explained the
Seventh Circuit, was that the state habeas court was rendering a decision
that required it to decide a "matter of degree" as opposed to whether a
finite right had been violated.75 In other words, the trial court had not
precluded Lindh from cross examining this witness; it had only limited
that examination. Whether that limitation was an abuse of discretion was
a question about which reasonable people "can, and do, differ."
76
According to the Seventh Circuit, where this type of decision was
required and where it was reached through "thoughtful" reasoning, it
should not be disturbed. Deciding whether the state court struck the
wrong balance within the limits of Supreme Court precedent was no
longer within the federal courts' power; ATEDA had eliminated this sort
of "fine tuning."
77
It seems that the court applied Teague principles to this discrete
issue as well. Teague rested on the idea that a careful, reasoned decision
by a state court should not be disturbed by a subsequent Supreme Court
decision--even if that decision meant that the state court ruling violated
a defendant's constitutional rights. Here, the Seventh Circuit ruled that
mere disagreement with a state court as to its application of Supreme
Court precedent no longer entitles a petitioner to relief. Unless the state
court has clearly transgressed what Supreme Court precedent requires,
habeas relief is not warranted--even if the federal court believes a
petitioner's constitutional rights were violated through the state court's
application of federal law.
78
Finally, the court rejected Lindh's argument under the first clause
of § 2254(d)(1) because no United States Supreme Court precedent
entitled Lindh to cross examine as to the alleged sexual misconduct of the
witness. Thus, the state court's decision was not "contrary to" Supreme
Court precedent. 79 In sum, the Seventh Circuithas interpreted § 2254(d)(1)
as an expansion of Teague v. Lane. ATEDA denies habeas petitioners the
benefit of any federal circuit court decisions that contravene a state
habeas court decision, limiting the universe of available beneficial law
beyond the limitation imposed by Teague. Also, ATEDA requires the
federal courts to reserve relief for "grave occasions," which apparently
are those where the state habeas court has rendered a careless decision
that clearly transgresses the "bounds" of Supreme Court precedent.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 876. Notably, after concluding that the correctness of the
trial court ruling was irrelevant, the court spent two full paragraphs
explaining how the factual determination by the trial court could have
been correct.
75 1d. at 871, 877.
76 Id. at 877.
77 Id. The court also stated that the deference owed to the state
court's determination should be the same as that established by the
Seventh Circuit for similar federal district court findings-ignoring their
previous conclusion that the correctness of state court decisions is now
to be measured only by United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
There is no mention of that Court's decisions as to the deference owed
to a state court in like circumstances. Id.
78 But see Fern v. Gramley, 99 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying
Lindh but finding state court decision unreasonable under Strickland v.
Two decisions by the Third Circuit suggest that it agrees with the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law "but that it disagrees with that court's explana-
tion of "contrary to clearly established federal law." In Berryman '.
Morton,80 the court announced that it was not reaching a decision as to
the meaning of § 2254(d)(1); nonetheless, it conducted an analysis under
ATEDA and stated that the Lindh rationale supported its conclusion.
81
Berryman was convicted of rape. On appeal, he raised an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, alleging several errors madeby trial counsel.
These mistakes were (1) counsel failed to use the victim's inconsistent
identification testimony to mitigate guilt; (2) counsel prejudiced the jury
by unnecessarily opening the door to a homicide and bank robbery
investigation undertaken with respect to Berryman's codefendant; and
(3) counsel failed to investigate potential defense witnesses. 82 The state
court determined that trial counsel's actions did not violate the standard
established in Strickland v. Washington.83 The federal district court
affirmed. The Third Circuit disagreed and granted Berryman relief:
"[W]e are convinced that the state court's determination that trial counsel
had a reasonable trial strategy is an 'error grave enough to be called
unreasonable.' 84 While the court stated that it believed the Lindh
rationale supported this finding, this conclusion remains questionable.
In Lindh, the Seventh Circuit stated that a weighty deference was
to be given state court decisions where the state court had chosen the right
standard but that standard required an exercise of discretion to determine
a matter of degree. Strickland is exactly that sort of test. What is
reasonable conduct on the part of an attorney, even with Strickland as a
guide, is a matter about which reasonable people can and do differ. Here,
it appears that the Third Circuit has merely disagreed with the state court
decision. The Seventh Circuit has explained that mere disagreement is
not enough to grant relief where a state habeas court decision on a "matter
of degree" was rendered with careful thought. At the same time, that
court implied that egregiousness was the appropriate focus. TheBerryman
court does not mention the carefulness or thoughtfulness with which the
state habeas court came to its conclusion. Instead, it appears that the
Third Circuit's decision rests on what it believes constitutes "grave"
error. What the Berryman holding reveals is that despite the Seventh
Circuit's insistence that a greater deference is now in place, ATEDA
allows a federal court nevertheless to grant relief where it disagrees
significantly with a state habeas court's conclusion of federal law, even
on a matter of degree.
InDickerson v. Vaughn,85 the Third Circuit again departed from the
rationale of Lindh. The court applied its own precedent to determine
whether the state habeas court had made a decision that was "contrary to
clearly established federal law."'86 In Dickerson, the petitioners had
pleaded nolo contendre to various criminal charges connected to drug
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) where state court condoned counsel's
tactics which constituted abandonment of client in circuit court's opin-
ion).
79 96 F.3d at 876. See also Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521
(S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that ATEDA limited the universe of law which
a state decision can contravene to Supreme Court precedent).
80 100 F.3d 1089 (3rd Cir. 1996).
t Id. at 1104.
82 1d. at 1097-1101.
83 466 U.S. 668 (1984). For one discussion of Strickland's applica-
tion in Virginia, see case summary of Stout v. Netherland, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
84 Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1104. (quoting Lindh, 96 F.3d at 870).
85 90 F.3d 87 (3rd Cir. 1996).
86 Id. at 90-93.
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transactions. They wanted to challenge the voluntariness of those pleas.
Specifically, they asserted that had their attorneys told them nolo pleas
barred appeal on the ground of double jeopardy, they would not have
entered those pleas. The state habeas court ruled that such a challenge
was precluded by statements made during the plea colloquies because
they included an admonition by the court that nolo pleas were the
equivalent of guilty pleas and that a plea of guilty relinquished rights to
appeal.87 The Third Circuit, citing its own precedent, held that "estab-
lished federal law prohibits giving such preclusive effect to plea collo-
quies."88
Although it appears as if the Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
are in conflict, the Third Circuit has not directly ruled on the meaning of
§ 2254(d)(1), so at the time of this writing, a grant of certiorari is unlikely
on this issue. Furthermore, while the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has also interpreted § 2254(d)(1) using different language, its
substantive result is the same as that of the Seventh Circuit in Lindh.
Hence, there is no present direct conflict among the circuits that would
suggest the likelihood of an early hearing by the United States Supreme
Court. InDrinkard v.Johnson,89 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the two
clauses ofsection 2254(d)(I) concerned two different types of questions:
the first addressed questions of law and the second addressed mixed
questions of law and fact. 90 This distinction was not drawn by the
Seventh Circuit; nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit's application of the
language of each clause comports with that of the Lindh court. First, the
Fifth Circuit found that absent United States Supreme Court precedent
that directly governed the case, there was no "clearly established federal
law" that the state habeas court could have contravened. Second, the Fifth
Circuit found that because reasonable jurists could differ as to whether
the state habeas court's application of the correct federal standard was
itself reasonable, the state decision should not be disturbed. Drinkard,
like Lindh, was not entitled to relief under ATEDA.
Drinkard's case presents an intricate issue that requires some
explanation. Drinkard was convicted of capital murder for the killings of
three persons. There was evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of
the killings. This evidence was presented at both the guilt phase and the
sentencing phase of his trial. At sentencing, the court gave the jury a
special instruction with regard to evidence of intoxication in mitigation
of death as a penalty. That instruction included a definition of temporary
insanity by means of intoxication, and concluded "[t]herefore, if you find
that the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense for which
he is on trial was temporarily insane as a result of intoxication, then you
may take such condition into consideration in mitigation" of death as a
penalty.9 1 Drinkard argued that if the jury found that he was intoxicated
but not to the degree that he was temporarily insane, this instruction
would preclude their consideration of that lesser degree of intoxication
87 1d. at 89.
8 8 Id. at 88.
89 97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996).
90 1d, at 767-68.
91 Id. at 755.
92 Id. at 756.
93 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that death penalty schemes must
not limit mitigating factors).
94 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (ruling that sentencer must consider wide
range of mitigation).
95 Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 756-57, 759.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 768-69.
98 Id. at 769 (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit glossed this
language in Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir. 1996). The court
in mitigation of death as a penalty.92 Such preclusion would violate
Lockett v. Ohio93 and Eddings v. Oklahoma94 which required that the
jury be able to consider all relevant evidence in mitigation. 95 The state
court identified Lockett and Eddings as controlling, but decided that the
instruction was not a violation of their rule. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that because the state habeas court correctly identified the legal standard,
its decision was not "contrary to established federal law, as determined
by the United States Supreme Court." 96 Apparently, the state habeas
court decision would have been reviewable under this language only if
the court had found that Lockett and Eddings did not apply, or perhaps,
had misstated their holdings.
Following through, the court addressed whether the state court's
application of Lockett and Eddings was "unreasonable," that is whether
the decision could be reviewed pursuant to the second clause of §
2254(d)(1). The court concluded that this language required more than
mere disagreement with the state court because mere disagreement
constituted de novo review, and ATEDA's language coupled with
legislative history required greater deference. 97 Accordingly, the court
held:
[Ain application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it
can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question
would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect.
In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court
decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable
among reasonable jurists.98
Drinkard did not satisfy this standard. Like the Lindh court, the Fifth
Circuit adopted a Teague-like rationale and refused to disturb a state
court holding where it was not clearly unreasonable in light of the
precedent under which it was decided.99 Further, the reasonableness of
the state decision was evidenced by the fact that "reasonable jurists" had
found differently on the issue. Those reasonable, yet differing, jurists
were the Drinkard panel itself.100 Judge Garza had dissented.
Judge Garza asserted that § 2254(d)(1) required that the reviewing
court look for more than just whether the state court identified the correct
standard of review. He thought that ATEDA's plain language required,
at minimum, that the state court's decision "accord with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution."10 1 He also disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of "unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished federal law." He argued that this language did not warrant a
departure from Supreme Court precedent that established de novo review
for mixed questions of law and fact. 102 Moreover, "reasonable jurists
would be of one view" was not a sensible standard of review:
stated that ATEDA codified the Supreme Court's position on federal
habeas in that "a reasonable, good faith application of Supreme Court
precedent will immunize the state court conviction from federal habeas
reversal, even if federal courts later reject that view of applicable
precedent." Id. at 1268.
99 But see Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221 (5th Cir. 1997)
(applying ATEDA and disagreeing with state court's conclusion that the
measure of counsel's assistance provided by Texas procedural law at a
plea hearing satisfied Strickland where counsel merely stood by in case
the court needed his assistance or the accused did not understand the
proceeding).
100 Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769.
101 Id. at 778 (Garska, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 778-79 (citing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 301-03
(1992)).
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Where a federal court of appeals determines that a state
criminal decision is contrary to federal law, § 2254(d)(1) does
not require the unanimous consent of the federal bench for
habeas relief. Indeed, it does not even require unanimity
among a panel of judges considering the case. The determina-
tion of reasonableness must consider only the propriety and
correctness of the state court's actions in the context of federal
guarantees established by the Supreme Court. 
103
Judge Garza concluded that where the federal court disagrees with
the state, the federal court's interpretation must prevail.104 In other
words, ATEDA merely codified existing federal habeas jurisprudence.
As to § 2254(d)(1), this conclusion stands alone. 105 More significantly,
the Fifth Circuit has expanded its interpretation of "contrary to clearly
established federal law" by ruling that where Supreme Court precedent
directly on point is lacking, a petitioner cannot establish that a state
habeas court decision contravened the law as determined by the Supreme
Court.
In Blankenship v. Johnson,106 the Fifth Circuit faced a question of
first impression. Specifically, it had to determine if an indigent person
was entitled to counsel when the State seeks discretionary review of his
successful appeal. Blankenship was convicted of aggravated robbery in
1988. He appealed that conviction, alleging that the indictment was
faulty because it misnamed his victim. The appellate court reversed his
conviction and ordered an acquittal. Subsequently, his attorney was
elected county attorney but failed to inform Blankenship or withdraw as
counsel of record. In January 1989, the state petitioned the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, seeking discretionary review of the reversal. The
petitions were served on Blankenship's attorney, but he took no action.
The court granted the petition and in March 1990 found for the state.
Blankenship remained ignorant of these events. He was arrested in April
1990.107
Subsequent efforts by Blankenship to contact his attorney were met
by silence until November 1991 when he replied: "'I have not withdrawn,
I was elected County Attorney and by law I cannot represent a defendant
in a criminal matter and also be a prosecutor for the State of Texas."'
' 108
The state habeas court denied Blankenship relief. He petitioned the
federal district court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on
his attorney's complete inactivity and conflict of interest. The district
court denied relief. 109
Because an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be predi-
cated on the right to counsel, the Fifth Circuit had to decide ifBlankenship
had a right to counsel when the State seeks discretionary review. The
court found that ATEDA barred relief.
The majority first held that because no Supreme Court precedent
addressed this question, there was nothing that the state decision could
103 Id. at 779.
104 Id.
105 With respect to § 2254(e)(2) which sets standards for granting
evidentiary hearings, more than one court has found that ATEDA
codifies existing federal habeas jurisprudence. See Section E, infra.
106 106 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir.1997).
107Id. at 1203.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1203-04.
110ld. at 1205.
I11 417 U.S. 600 (174).
112 Blankenship, 106 F.3dat 1205. Apparently, the court conducted
an analysis under the "unreasonable application" language in the alter-
native to its first holding. There is no other apparent reason why the court
would conclude there was no Supreme Court precedent that could be
contravene. The plain language of § 2254(d)(1) barred relief.110 The
court then reviewed the state decision under the "reasonableness" clause
of § 2254(d)(1). The court identified Ross v. Moffit t 11 as the governing
Supreme Court precedent. 112 Moffit held that a defendant has no right
to counsel when he seeks discretionary review. 113 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that a reasonable jurist could have concluded thatMoffit stood
for the broader proposition that "a defendant who once enjoyed the
benefit of counsel to review the record, prepare a brief, and muster the
evidence was not entitled to counsel on discretionary review, regardless
of who requested that review."1 14 The court concluded that given the
language in Moffit that supported this conclusion, "one cannot reason-
ably conclude that the state court decision was directly contrary to Moffit,
and certainly not that what Blankenship argues for now was 'clearly
established.' 115 Further, the majority refused to interpret Supreme
Court silence as an affirmation of the opposing view. Instead, § 2254(d)(1)
required that the federal reviewing court look only to positive pronounce-
ments by the Supreme Court to meet the "clearly established" stan-
dard. 116 Because there was no positive pronouncement by the Supreme
Court which contravened the state court decision, ATEDA barred relief.
Judge Parker dissented. He concluded that the majority's insistence
upon the existence of Supreme Court precedent "on all fours" with the
facts of the case in question was an erroneous interpretation of §
2254(d)(1). 117 Instead, section 2254(d)(1) "instructs the federal courts
to examine a state court's decision in relation to the Supreme Court's
body of law" in its entirety. 11 ATEDA did not preclude granting relief
on a petition simply because its facts did not track the facts of any
Supreme Court precedent. Section 2254(d)(1) should be interpreted to
have the same purpose as Teague: "ensurting] that state judgments are
not affected by legal rules established after a conviction becomes final.
A legal rule or right is 'clearly established' if it was 'compelled by
existing precedent."'1 19
The Blankenship majority's rationale follows Lindh in one respect.
Lindh requires Supreme Court precedent directly on point before it will
find that a federal court can determine that a state court decision was
"contrary to clearly established federal law." The dissent inBlankenship
seems to hold the more logical view that the federal court's review should
be based on Supreme Court jurisprudence in its entirety. The Third
Circuit apparently agrees in so far that its application of ATEDA has
included looking to a broader body of federal law. That court has gone
beyond Judge Parker's suggestion, however, by looking to its own
precedent as well to determine if the state court decision was "contrary
to clearly established federal law." At the same time, that court has not
directly interpreted § 2254. Also, while the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit have taken different approaches to ATEDA, their results accord
with one another.
contravened and then analyze the case for a reasonable application of
Moffit.
113 417 U.S. at 610.
114 Blankenship, 106 F.3d at 1206.
115 Id. at 1205.
1 16 The court explained further that it was "instructive" that instead
of adopting language from habeas jurisprudence, Congress chose lan-
guage that echoed the test for qualified immunity under § 1983 which has
a well-settled meaning. In other words, "contrary to clearly established
law" could be understood to mean that a state habeas court's ruling must
be apparently unlawful before relief was warranted. Id. at 1206.
117 1d. at 1211.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1212 (emphasis in original).
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These early decisions do not discuss one important distinction
between claims evaluated under the new 2254(d)(1) and those subjected
to Teague analysis. That distinction suggests that the Lindh approach is
flawed. Teague doctrine defers to possibly erroneous state law conclu-
sions of federal law that were reached without the benefit of later
Supreme Court holdings identifying the error. Identical Teague-type
deference under new 2254(d)(1) arguably makes much less sense, given
that both state and federal courts have access to the same universe of
constitutional law at the time of decision. Other factors, including the
language of § 2254 itself, may call for a degree of deference, but it is to
be hoped that the ultimate resolution of the issue does not ignore the
absence, in § 2254 situations, of a bedrock justification for Teague.
F. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) 120: Evidentiary HearingsI
Before ATEDA, federal grants of evidentiary hearings were gov-
erned by Townsend v. Sain12 l and Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes.
122
Evidentiary hearings were warranted when the state court failed to afford
a petitioner sound process. In Townsend, the Court set down six circum-
stances where a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
state hearing; (2) the state factual determination (was] not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there [was] a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6)
for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 123
The Supreme Court modified the fifth factor in Keeney. The Court
held that even if a petitioner alleged sufficient facts, an evidentiary
hearing was not required unless the petitioner could show cause and
prejudice for the failure of adequate development in state court, or unless
there was a miscarriage of justice. 124
Additionally, pre-ATEDA petitioners could be granted an evidentiary
hearing if they could show that '"a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the
crime'"--the miscarriage of justice exception articulated in Keeney.
125
120 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) reads:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of
a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold
an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant
shows that-
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retro-
active to cases on collateral review by the Su-
preme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of
due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient
A petitioner also could get an evidentiary hearing where he could show
that but for the constitutional error at trial no reasonable jury would have
found him eligible for the death penalty, again a miscarriage of justice
showing.126 In Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, the Seventh Circuit held that
ATEDA has eliminated the innocence of the death penalty claim.
127
In Pitsonbarger, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of
murder and two counts of felony murder. The jury sentenced him to
death. 128 On appeal, Pitsonbarger claimed that his counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to inform the court that Pitsonbarger was taking Librium,
a psychotropic drug, prior to his examination for fitness to stand trial.
Under Illinois law, if he had been found unfit to stand trial but later found
fit provided that he received expert medical assistance, he would have
been deemed ineligible for the death penalty. 129 The court found that his
Librium claim was procedurally defaulted and that he could not show
cause for failure to raise this claim earlier. More significantly, the court
held that his assertion of actual innocence of the death penalty was no
longer available under ATEDA. 130 It is not settled, however, that
ATEDA has eliminated this claim. Other courts have disagreed with
Pistonbarger, including the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana.
In Burris v. Parke, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana, after Pitsonbarger, held that an argument for inno-
cence of the death penalty was available under ATEDA. 131 The Seventh
Circuit has not overruled this case. In Burris, the petitioner raised
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time in state habeas
and requested an evidentiary hearing to develop the claims. The state
habeas court denied his request. 132 The district court found that under
Keeney, Burris would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because the state failed to provide him a full and fair hearing on his
ineffective assistance claims which were before that court for the first
time. 133 UnderATEDA, however, Burris was notentitledto an evidentiary
hearing.
The court explained that the key to interpreting § 2254(e)(2) lay in
the meaning of "the applicant has failed to develop." Burris argued that
this language codified Keeney so that the section applied only if the
petitioner was at fault for the inadequate factual record. The court
disagreed, finding that the language applied to the "'non-development of
any claim in state proceedings regardless of the fault of the petitioner
in not developing the claim which is then in turn subject to two stated
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but
for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
121 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
122504 U.S. 1 (1992).
123 372 U.S. at 313.
124 Keeney, 504 U.S. at 7-8.
125 Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (adopting
standard from Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)).
126 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
127 103 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1996).
128Id. at 1297.
129 Id. at 1298.
130ld. at 1299-1300.
131 948 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
132 1d. at 1316-17.
133Id. at 1323.
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exceptions.' 134 The court ruled that the language must carry this
meaning because if it did not then the language of subsection (A)(ii) was
mere surplusage. 135 This interpretation is sound. If the language codified
Keeney, the statute would in effect say: where it is petitioner's fault that
the facts are not developed he does not get an evidentiary hearing unless
it is not petitioner's fault that the facts are not developed. Instead,
according to the district court, the language must be interpreted to read:
where a claim was not factually developed in the state court, the
petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner
was not at fault for the inadequate record. Thus, despite the apparently
plain language, "if the petitioner has failed to develop," rules of statutory
construction require an interpretation that avoids surplusage. The court
found that Burris satisfied this test because the state court denied him the
opportunity to develop the facts. But he could not satisfy subsection (B)
which requires a showing of actual innocence of the crime by clear and
convincing evidence. His guilt was not in dispute.
Nevertheless, the court determined that the unusual circumstances
of the case 136 made it inequitable to rule according to a strict interpreta-
tion of the statute. Thus, the court ruled that Burris might yet be granted
relief if he could show innocence of the death penalty. 137 The court
finally ruled, however, that Burris could not establish that the facts
underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claims would be suffi-
cient to show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror
would have recommended the death penalty. 138 The court's ruling that
Burris could raise an innocence of the death penalty claim despite
ATEDA's language is encouraging, but the court also made clear that it
was allowing the claim only because disallowing it appeared inequitable
under the facts. Thus, Burris may be limited to its facts, but whether it is
so limited is not clear.
One court has interpreted Burris to stand for the proposition that
ATEDA has not eliminated innocent-of-the-death-penalty arguments. In
Housel v. Thomas,139 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia found the ambiguity of § 2254(e)(2) posed a different
question-a threshold question. That court asked: did § 2254(e)(2) apply
to penalty phase claims? The court explained that it found the reasoning
of Burris persuasive and held that a federal evidentiary hearing on
penalty phase claims must be granted where the petitioner satisfied the
plain language of section 2254(e)(2)(A) and satisfied subsection (B) by
1341d. at 1325. (quotingBean v. Calderon, No. CIV S-90-648 WBS/
GGH, at 8 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 1996 (emphasis added))). But see
Washington v. Mazurkiewicz, 1997 WL 83771, *2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25,
1997) (stating that under ATEDA a procedural default for which the
petitioner cannot be blamed does not preclude an evidentiary hearing);
Brewer v. Marshall, 941 F. Supp. 216,228-29 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding
that § 2254(e)(2) applies only where the petitioner has failed to develop
the factual basis of a claim); Caro v. Vasquez, 1996 WL-478683 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 19, 1996) (finding that where petitioner had not failed to
adequately develop facts § 2254(e)(2) did not bar granting an evidentiary
hearing but that evidentiary hearing was not necessary because claims
could be resolved on pleadings and state court record).
135 Id. at 1326.
136The unique circumstances that the court found inequitable were
that, in the complex procedural history of the case, Indiana denied Burris
the opportunity to fully litigate his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, as required by Lindh. An important factor in this determination
was that the state court rejection of one of his statehabeas petitions onthat
showing that "'the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to show
by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have recommended him for the death
penalty.'"140 The court rejected the argument that § 2254(e)(2) codified
existing law, and it rejected the argument that it was limited to claims of
innocence of the crime. 14 1 The Burris opinion and the Housel holding
clearly stand for the proposition that ATEDA has not eliminated inno-
cence of the death penalty claims.
III. Conclusion
Counsel should note that Virginia has not qualified as an opt-in
state, but the Fourth Circuit has ordered that the district and circuit courts
render their decisions according to the time schedule set forth in § 2266.
Whether Virginia will qualify as an opt-in state probably depends upon
further action by the legislature. It must provide standards of competency
for counsel sufficient to satisfy the courts--even the Fourth Circuit has
indicated that Virginia does not yet qualify.
Neither the Fourth Circuit nor any Virginia district court has
interpreted § 2254(d). Consequently, the kind and degree of deference
owed to Virginia state court decision§ remains an open question. While
ostensibly there is some disagreement among the circuit courts that have
rendered interpretations, this discord does not yet suggest early review
by the Supreme Court. However, the Lindh and Drinkard opinions are
finding support in the district courts and counsel should be familiar with
them.
Finally, it appears that the courts do disagree as to whether the
standards for evidentiary hearings have been changed by § 2254(e)(2).
Some courts maintain that this section codified existing law while others
held that it imposed more stringent standards, eliminating the "innocent
of the death penalty" basis for the miscarriage of justice exception.
It would appear that the task for Virginia habeas counsel is to adopt,
refine, and modify the analysis and arguments found in these cases.
Those arguments should reflect the view that the Great Writ should not
be subjected to further shrinkage as the provisions of ATEDA are
interpreted. Finally, new arguments directed to this goal are solicited by
the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse and will be disseminated to the
widest possible audience.
issue was not "a careful and well-reasoned opinion." Id. at 131-22.
Agreeing with Burris on these two points, and considering the Supreme
Court law to be Strickland, the court purported to be reviewing under
ATEDA's new standard, but the court gave no deference to the state
court's conclusions. Id.
137 But see Hunter v. Vasquez, 1996 WL 612484, *5-*6 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 1996) (ruling that section 2254(e)(2) not only codified Keeney but
removed the federal court's authority to make discretionary grants of
evidentiary hearings).
138 Burris, 948 F. Supp. at 1327. The facts underlying the claim are
very lengthy but also very interesting. Apparently, Burris had been shot
in the head and was asserting that he suffered from organic brain
dysfunction, among other problems. Counsel did not introduce these
facts in mitigation. For interested readers, they appear on pages 1327-8.
139 1997 WL 67823 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 11, 1997).
140Id. at *3.
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